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The pricing,utilization,and taxation of our
petroleum and natural gas resources is a subject that has proven itself too important to be
ignored by politicians. It is also a subject that
is too important to be left to politicians. Tonight I hope to stimulate a reexamination of
our national policies toward the natural gas
industry, a reexamination free of the sectional
and ideological biases that have beclouded if
not completely obscured these policies in the
past.
The widely publicized shortage of natural
gas is but the best known symptom of the policy. Harried utility executives explain their
inability to meet new demands for natural gas
on the ground that there is a shortage. Producing companies use the existence of the shortage
to support their requests for higher gas prices.
But when we turn from claims to fact, we find
that this much discussed shortage is an extraordinary phenomenon. The total marketed
production of natural gas in the United States
has not been decreasing. It has been increasing. The most recent figures are those for deliveries by the interstate pipelines. They show
a steady increase. Natural gas provides roughly
one-third of the energy consumed in the American economy, perhaps the most significant
comparative advantage we enjoy. By contrast,
the German economy obtains only 3.4 percent
of its energy from natural gas. We have, along
with the Russians, enjoyed the unique advan'This paper is based upon a presentation made by Edmund
W. Kitch, Professor of Law, The University of Chicago,
May 27, 1971, at a seminar in Washington sponsored by the
Law School. The original study on which this paper was
based was sponsored by the Law and Economics Program at
the Law School.

tage of substantial natural gas reserves within
economic and political reach of our population and industrial centers. It is not an advantage we should lightly throw away.
When we turn from statistics on the current
consumption of natural gas to future availability, the picture is less bright. Reserves have
almost been keeping pace with production.
But because of the increased production, the
ratio of reserves to production has been falling.
The Federal Power Commission 1969 staff
study on the supply of natural gas showed
that in 1969 the interstate pipelines had sufficient reserves to maintain 90 to 95 percent of
their delivery rate for six and one-half years,
down from 13 years in 1963. But these decclining reserve ratios and deliverability periods
are difficult to interpret. There is no theory
which tells us what the optimum level of reserves is. Is the present decline a decline from
a level of abnormally high inventory toward a
more optimum level? Or is it a decline toward
disaster? We can predict on the basis of past
experience that new reserves will be discovered. Perhaps these new discoveries will be
sufficient to maintain the present level of production for many years to come. All observers
agree that potential reserves within the lower
48 states - those reserves not yet found but
likely to be found in time - exceed those already produced. Whether or not the new discoveries will be sufficient to support continued
production at the present rate past 1975 is a
question that must keep not a few gas company executives awake at night. Whatever
alternative use might be developed for the
immense in place natural gas pipeline system
which their companies own, I suspect that
that use will be less productive of revenue than
is the transmission of natural gas. There is no
way to predict future discoveries of natural
gas other than by projecting recent trends into
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the future. These trends suggest that declining
production will be upon us by the end of the
decade.
In spite of the basic abundance of natural
gas with which our nation is blessed, and in
spite of an acceptable although worrisome near
term supply situation, we are at the present
time experiencing shortages in the interstate
consumer market for natural gas. These shortages result not from the inadequacy of nature's
bounty, but from the regulation of the Federal
Power Commission effectively imposed on the
field market for natural gas in 1961. 1 first became aware of the fact that this regulation
would necessarily lead to a shortage in the interstate consumer market - an excess of demand in relation to supply - during my early
research into the regulation and the industry
during 1967. 1 reasoned that since the regulation froze the price of natural gas to the
consumer subject only to possible marginal increases that might be obtained through the
complex and snarled procedures of the Commission, and since the long term trend of all
energy prices in the United States is up, the
regulation would operate to make natural gas
the cheapest energy source and therefore an
energy source many consumers would desire to
obtain. In my article on the subject, published
in the Journal of Law and Economics in 1968,
I developed this argument in full. I there had
to deal at length, however, with one embarrassing fact. Why, if the regulation would necessarily cause a supply demand imbalance and
had been in effect since 1961, had no such
imbalance been reported? The answer I there
offered was that due to a short term down
trend in the price of coal for electric power
generation, the total demand for natural gas
had not been increasing through the early
1960's. Price indices for non-regulated seg-

ments of the industry seemed to confirm this
hypothesis. I now think that that argument
oversimplified, and that, as is suggested by
Paul MacAvoy in an article also published in
the Journalof Law and Economics and appro-

priately entitled: "The Regulation Induced
Shortage of Natural Gas," price stability was
also achieved in the mid-1960's by a dilution
of the economic quality of the product. This
decline in quality resulted from the decline in
certainty that delivery rates could be maintained in the future. The consumer was able
to buy natural gas at the same or even slightly
lower price per thousand cubic feet of gas, but
for his money he got less assurance that he
could rely on the availability of natural gas in
the future. Apparently as a result of these two
factors, the shortage which I considered inevitable had not appeared by 1968. In my article
I predicted that when and if the demand for
natural gas increased, there would be a shortage.
Since the publication of that article the demand for natural gas had increased and a
shortage has begun to develop.
The existence of this regulation induced
shortage is not of itself harmful. It simply
means that energy users desire to purchase
more natural gas at the regulated price than
they can obtain. Unable to obtain it, they
must turn to other fuels. But if the price rose,
that would also force consumers to turn to
other fuels. Indeed, for reasons that I shall
develop in more detail, it is my view that this
shortage will disappear within the next three
to five years. The price freeze which causes the
present disequilibrium is, however, harmful
to the national interest for two reasons. First
of all, the price freeze denies to interstate consum'ers of energy supplies of natural gas that
could be produced at costs lower than the alternative forms of energy to which the con4

sumers are forced to turn. Second, the price
freeze bargain price encourages the continuation of economically inferior end uses of natural gas instead of stimulating the reallocation
of gas supplies to users who would obtain a
greater economic benefit from them.
The Commission's regulation of sales by
producers of natural gas to interstate pipelines
affects the supply of natural gas available to
those pipelines in a number of different ways.
First, and most dramatically, the regulation
has made it difficult for the interstate pipelines to purchase gas at all. In the unregulated
intrastate markets the price of natural gas has
moved above the Federal Power Commission
ceiling prices. Needless to say, producers prefer, whenever they can, to sell to an intrastate
customer at a higher unregulated price under
contracts that can provide, unlike Commission
regulated contracts, for future price increases
if the demand for natural gas increases still
further. There is only one area where the interstate pipelines now can hope to obtain substantial quantities of natural gas and that is
the federal domain offshore Louisiana and
Texas. All gas produced there moves in interstate commerce as it comes onshore and therefore is subject to Commission regulation.
There is no competing unregulated market.
But outside the federal offshore area, the regulation operates in the same way that a prohibition on purchases of gas by interstate pipelines would operate.
More generally, the federal regulation de-

presses the price of natural gas in all markets.
This lower price means that natural gas reserves that would be found and produced at
the higher price are simply left unfound and
unproduced. Firms exploring for natural gas
will drill those geophysical prospects that
offer a positive risk reward ratio. A higher
5

price would increase the potential reward and
therefore the risk that those firms would be
willing to assume. It is impossible to predict
a priori the amount of gas that would be
found as the result of higher prices. Research
on past price changes shows that the impact on
new discoveries has always been significant.
One of the particular ironies of the situation is
that a very substantial increase in the field
price of natural gas would mean only a relatively small increase to consumers. For instance, in 1967 the average well head price for
gas in Louisiana was 18.5 cents per thousand
cubic feet while the average price to the residential user in New York was 142.3 cents.
Thus a doubling of the Louisiana field price to
37 cents would have meant only a 13 percent
price increase to the residential user. The consumer price index has itself increased more
than 13 percent since 1967, but the price of
gas in the offshore federal domain has risen
less than 20 percent.
The impact of the lower regulated prices on
the critical federal offshore area is particularly
important for the interstate pipelines. The
federal government is the owner of the federal
offshore area. It makes this acreage available
to exploration companies by offering leases
with a 16 percent royalty rate for competitive
bidding. The firm offering the highest cash
payment obtains the opportunity to explore
for and produce any natural gas on the leased
acreage. The most dramatic effect of the regulation in the offshore domain is to decrease
the price which the federal government receives on its own leases. But since the Department of the Interior, as the responsible
custodian of these national properties, is unwilling to give them away, it will not lease
tracts that receive only nominal bids. These
tracts - which would have substantial value
were it not for the regulation and would then
6

be leased - are, because of the regulation, unavailable for exploration. The President of
the American Gas Association has suggested
that this problem could be solved by following
British practice and giving the tracts to the
producing companies on condition that they
do a certain amount of exploration work. This
method has its own serious difficulties as the
studies of the British gas leasing system by
Kenneth W. Dam published in recent issues
of the Journal of Law and Economics have
shown, but I need only note here that it is
more than a little ironic to first hold down the
price of natural gas in order to limit the profits
of exploration companies and then to turn
around and attempt to overcome that effect by
providing the exploration companies with the
opportunity to make free use of a valuable
national asset.
The detrimental impact of the regulation
on the supply of natural gas results not only
from the present low ceiling price. It also results from the unpredictability of the regula.
tory process itself. In an unregulated market,
producers could predict simply through an
examination of world wide energy supply and
demand trends that the price of domestically
produced natural gas would rise. They could
then proceed to make exploration expenditures now based on their expectation of higher
prices in the future. But the vagaries of the
regulatory process make any prediction as to
the future price of natural gas difficult if not
impossible. The Commission now seems set
on a course toward higher prices, albeit in a
confused and halting way, subject to substantial risk at any point of judicial reversal. But
the election of John F. Kennedy to the Presidency in 1960 brought the imposition of the
present price freeze, and the election of another New Englander in 1972 might quickly
halt the move to higher prices. The producing
7

companies can only wait and see what will
happen.
The price freeze on natural gas has consequences not only for the supply but also for
the demand side of the market. These effects
may be the most important of all. The period
when natural gas could increase its share of
our national energy supply is over. Our best
hope is that natural gas can for the next ten to
twenty years hold its own, supplying around
30 percent of our energy needs. It is important that that 30 percent constitute the best
uses to which the gas can be put. In brief, our
best strategy seems to be to reduce the amount
of natural gas consumed by large industrial
users who are in a position to burn coal with
sufficient exhaust treatment to satisfy clean
air requirements and move the gas thus made
available to those users who are unable to
economically employ exhaust treatment facilities. The problem of the end use of gas is
usually discussed under the ruberic of industrial versus non-industrial uses. This is somewhat misleading because many industrial uses
of natural gas are vital to the economy. The
clean and uniform burning properties of natural gas are necessary for a number of important industrial processes. But the only
statistics available on gas utilization categorize
uses as industrial, commercial and residential
and therefore we must employ those categories
simply to discuss the problem.
We know that the price of natural gas has
an important impact on the percentage of gas
which is used industrially. This is shown, for
instance, by the regional variations in industrial use which correlate with the price in that
region. The ability of higher prices to reallocate the end use of gas was dramatically displayed during the gas supply crunch of the
early 1920's. At that time the natural gas in8

dustry was confined to a small area located
along the Appalachian gas fields. The wholesale market price was unregulated because a
substantial part of the gas originated in West
Virginia but was consumed in Ohio, Pennsylvania and New York. This interstate commerce was beyond the reach of any state and
there was no federal regulation. The supply
of gas dropped off rapidly. But so did the percentage of industrial use.
Can a regulatory system do as well? There
is no doubt that the Federal Power Commission and the state regulatory agencies will attempt to reallocate the end use of gas if the
present shortage becomes more serious. But
the low regulated price of the gas to the consumer will give all users a substantial incentive
to continue their present purchases. The authority of the regulatory agencies to terminate
service to present customers is at best murky
and probably non-existent. So they will be
forced to simply prohibit all new customers
from buying gas without regard to the particular customer's need for it. And if the regulatory authorities do attempt to sever old
customers from the system, they will be forcefully resisted by any class of customers slated
for termination. Higher prices on the other
hand would cause those customers who need
the gas least to voluntarily surrender their gas
supply.
But not only is there reason to think that

the present regulatory system cannot reallocate
the available gas away from industrial users
who are in a position to economically use alternative fuels. There is good reason to think
that the present system has had the effect of
increasing the amount of gas used industrially.
This is due to two facts. First of all, the Federal Power Commission regulates only sales
for resale. Sales by interstate pipelines to ulti9

mate users - and these so-called "direct" sales
are all to industrial users - are not subject to
price regulation, by the Federal Power Commission. As a result, industrial users have had
an advantageous position from which to bid
for the available supplies of natural gas. It is
true that the Federal Power Commission has
power to limit these sales by refusing to certify the construction of the facilities necessary
to make delivery. But in an age of air pollution, the argument that each sale would mean
cleaner air has effectively neutralized that potential power.
The second reason that the present regulation has encouraged the industrial uses of
natural gas is related to the regional distribution of those industrial uses. The West South
Central area is composed of the states of Texas,
Louisiana, Arkansas and Oklahoma. In these
states natural gas is largely supplied by the
intrastate market. This area is the most intensive natural gas consuming area in the nation.
The area consumes 34 percent of the natural
gas produced in the United States. Ninety-one
percent of the gas consumed in this region is
consumed industrially. Put another way, 40
percent of all natural gas in the United States
which is consumed industrially is consumed
in the West South Central area. By holding
down the price of natural gas within the region, the federal regulation has effectively
acted as a subsidy to this industrial market,
and therefore as a subsidy to the industrial
growth of the southwest. The only practical
way to reduce the industrial use of gas within
the southwest is to raise the price of gas in
that region. The federal regulation prevents
that from happening, and by foreclosing the
out of state residential gas consumer from purchasing the gas, leaves it for the southwestern
industrial user. Put another way, the residential gas consumer of the Pacific Coast, upper
10

midwest and the east coast is prevented by
federal law from paying 10 to 15 percent more
for his gas, thereby making gas in the American southwest 50 percent cheaper than it
would otherwise be and subsidizing the movement of industry from the consumer's home region to the southwest.
The present federal regulation of natural
gas imposes higher costs on the interstate consumer of natural gas by (1) forcing him to
purchase more expensive alternative fuels, (2)
reducing the dependability of his gas supply
and (3) subsidizing the industrial use of natural gas in intrastate markets.
In order to explain the effects of the regulation, I find it illuminating to compare it to
the oil import program. On the surface, no
two programs could be more different. The
oil import program restricts the importation
of foreign crude oil into the United States,
thereby raising the price of oil to energy consumers and benefiting the owners of oil production in the southwest. The import program
has been fought by the representatives of the
northeast, it has been championed by the representatives of the southwest. Natural gas regulation, on the other hand, is designed to hold
down the price of natural gas to the consumer,
hurting the owners of gas production in the
southwest. It has been championed by the representatives of the consuming states and opposed by the representatives of the southwest.
Thus the oil import program and natural gas
regulation would seem to be two perfectly
offsetting government programs. One holds
prices up. The other holds prices down. One
stimulates the search for domestic reserves; the
other discourages it. Indeed, it was for the
Chairman of the Federal Power Commission,
serving as a member of the President's Task
Force on Oil Import Controls, to point out the
II

symmetry of the two programs. He argued that
the oil import program was necessary to hold
up the price of oil in order to stimulate the
search for petroleum which would otherwise
be unduly depressed by the low natural gas
prices imposed by the Commission he heads.
Unfortunately, however, if the programs are
properly analyzed, they can be shown not to
be offsetting but harmonious. The effect of the
oil import program is to limit the ability of
American energy consumers to bid for inexpensive foreign crude oil. The effect of the
Federal Power Commission's regulation of
natural gas is to limit the ability of American
energy consumers outside the southwest to bid
for relatively inexpensive natural gas. The
consumer loses not once, but twice.
What, then, will happen now? First of all,
I believe that the shortage will end in time
barring some dramatic shift in total American
energy supply, and that it will end without regard to whether or not the field price of natural gas is raised. The interstate pipelines
and the distribution utilities cannot long tolerate a shortage because of their vulnerability
to the political reaction which will be caused
by inadequate service. And all that is necessary to end the shortage is higher prices to
the consumer. The utilities can raise their
prices if they can raise their costs. This they
are proceeding to do with gusto. Barred from
paying more for domestically produced natural gas, they will spend their money some
other way. They will buy unregulated gas
from Canada at higher prices. They will buy
unregulated Liquid Natural Gas from Algeria
and Venezuela at prices more than double
what they are presently paying for domestic
gas. They will construct enormous gassification plants first using natural gas liquids, then
if necessary, coal, as a feedstock. They will
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make millions of dollars in advances to natural
gas producers in exchange merely for an option to buy any gas found if they can include
those advances in their rate base. In short,
they will do anything necessary, including
wasting money, in order to drive up their costs
and hence their prices and to restore equilibrium in the consumer market for natural gas.
They know that if they fail, they probably face
complete government supervision if not ownership of all of their operations. It would be
so easy to simply let them pay for the gas
they need.
Secondly, I believe that representatives of
the consuming states will rapidly lose their
enthusiasm for natural gas regulation as those
states experience natural gas shortages. This is
already evident in Congressman Murphy's misnamed sanctity of contracts bill which makes
some minor but helpful changes in the direction of deregulation. But it will take some
time before the consuming states wake up to
what is happening.
Thirdly, I believe that in time the representatives of the southwest will oppose termination of the regulation. These states are no
longer dominated by the petroleum industry,
and that industry is no longer dominated by
its American production. Natural resource
rich regions have generally preferred to use
those resources to stimulate the development
of industry at home rather than exporting
them in raw form to industries located elsewhere. Indeed in the early parts of this century the producing states attempted to do just
that, prohibiting the export of natural gas.
Fortunately, the Supreme Court intervened
under the interstate commerce clause to invalidate such regulation. But I now wonder
whether the producing states, having obtained
such a position courtesy of the federal governnient, will lightly give it up.
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